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INTRODUCTION
T HE role of the lay juror is an integral part of the American trial system.
It is so essential that a jury trial is constitutionally mandated in the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments.! According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the framers of the Constitution sought to protect individuals' rights against
government oppression by guaranteeing a trial by an impartial jury.3 The
use of lay jurors as fact finders at trial is rooted in the concept of fairness.
4
While the jurors are not expected to be legal experts, they are expected to
apply the law to the facts in rendering their judgments.5 The applicable
law is communicated to the jury through the instructions, usually read to
the jury by the judge at the end of closing arguments. This is typically
the jury's only exposure to the law, and judges and attorneys go to great
lengths to ensure that the instructions fairly and completely state that law.6
Yet, jurors' incomprehension of the law is a well-documented crisis in the
judicial system. 7 Jury instructions suffer from "a perfect storm of legal
jargon, outdated language, and antiquated procedures."8 Because many
jurors cannot understand the law that they are expected to apply to the
facts of the case, the constitutional right to a fair trial is at stake.9
Juror incomprehension of the law in jury instructions is a widespread
I Bachelor of Arts in History and Philosophy, zoo6, University of Notre Dame; Juris
Doctor expected 2o io, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
4 Bethany K. Dumas, Communicating with Juries: Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TNN. L. REV. 701, 707 (zo00).
5 Id.
6 Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 92 (1895) (instructing the trial judge to "adjudge all
questions of law, and direct the jury thereon").
7 See, e.g., Robert M. Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 8-14 (1935); ARTHUR
D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY 55-56 (1984);
SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, TIIE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 141-63 (1988);
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (zoo1).
8 Molly Armour, Dazed and Confused: The Needfor a Legislative Solution to the Constitutional
Problem ofJuror Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 641, 642 (2007).
9 Id. at 641-42.
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problem in American courts. This Note will explore the reasons why jury
reform has been slow to take effect despite scientific and academic support
and argue that reforming the language and presentation of instructions
will aid jurors in understanding the law. Part I of the Note will explore
the important role the jury plays in American judicial system. Part II will
examine the four primary reasons why jury instructions have been resistant
to change. Part III will discuss the debate regarding whether reforming
jury instructions for greater clarity will sacrifice other functions of pattern
jury instructions and argue that reformation is possible without disrupting
these other functions. Lastly, Part IV will advocate a holistic approach
to reforming jury instruction, including simplifying the language of the
instructions and modifying the instructional process.
I. THE JURY'S ROLE IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The Constitution assures the right of a criminal defendant to "a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."'1 In civil cases, the defendant has a
right to a trial by jury "where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars."" The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to define precisely
how this guarantee of a jury trial is to be provided. They have outlined
processes for jury selection," the number of jurors required, 3 and which
defendants are entitled to a jury.'4 The purpose of the jury in ensuring
fairness in a trial is a time-honored and respected tradition in the American
judicial system:
The Anglo-American jury is a remarkable political institution....
It recruits a group of twelve laymen, chosen at random from the widest
population; it convenes them for the purpose of the particular trial; it
entrusts them with great official powers of decision; it permits them to carry
on deliberations in secret and to report out their final judgments without
giving reasons for it; and, after their momentary service to the state has been
completed, it orders them to disband and return to private life. The jury thus
1o U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
I I U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
12 Batson v. Kentucky, 467 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a prosecutor from challenging jurors based on their race); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522,533 (1975) (holding that "women cannot be systematically excluded from jury panels
from which petit jurors are drawn").
13 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (holding that a five-member jury deprives
a criminal defendant of the "right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments").
14 Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 545 (I989) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee a person charged with DUI to a trial by jury under Nevada
law).
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represents a deep commitment to the use of laymen in the administration
of justice .... It opposes the cadre of professional, experienced judges with
this transient, ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs.
A fair trial requires that the "jury is apprised of the law, including
constitutional standards and presumptions, and that a jury properly
applies the law to the facts."' 6 Thus, jurors' inability to comprehend their
instructions on the law undermines the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial by jury.
The potential danger of juries' misapplication of the law to facts is most
poignantly seen in death penalty cases, where the very life of the defendant
depends on a jury's understanding of the law. In Weeks v. Angelone,17 the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in a five-to-four decision that a trial judge need only
to re-read the controlling language of the instructions when presented with
jurors' questions regarding crucial death penalty sentencing instructions1 8
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed that jurors are
capable of understanding their instructions simply by hearing the judge
read them.' 9 In fact, trial judges often answer juror questions by reiterating
the applicable portion of the instructions; however, there is no evidence
that this reiteration assists jurors to better comprehend the law."0 On
the contrary, some case studies and legal professionals suggest that this
response actually treats juror incomprehension as if the jury had not heard
the instructions rather than not having understood them."
Some appellate courts have suggested that merely allowing jurors to
ask questions regarding instructions is an error."2 In People v. Redd,3 the
defendant argued that the trial judge erred in merely reiterating the jury
instructions after jurors asked for an explanation in simpler language.
24
Although the court ruled that the issue was not properly preserved, it noted
that it would have rejected the appeal on the merits because re-reading
the initial instructions provided "adequate guidance." 5 In his concurring
opinion, Judge Saxe argued that "consistency within the criminal justice
system is a more important goal than clarification of language for the benefit
15 HENRY KALVEN, JR., & HANs ZEISEL, ThE AMERICAN JURY 3-4 (1966).
16 Armour, supra note 8, at 644.
17 Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (zooo).
18 Id. at 234.
I9 Id.
20 Dumas, supra note 4, at 704.
21 Id.; see also Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury
Inquiries in CapitalCases, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 627, 627 (zooo).
22 Dumas, supra note 4, at 712.
23 People v. Redd, 698 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y App. Div. 1999).
24 Id. at 215.
25 Id.
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of the jury." 6 Weeks and Redd illustrate the need for reforming courts'
attitudes regarding jury instructions. In order to provide the constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial, the courts must place greater emphasis on jurors'
comprehension of the law.
II. WHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN RESISTENT TO CHANGE
There are four primary reasons that legal professionals resist reforming
jury instructions despite the large amount of research showing that jurors
rarely comprehend their instructions.
27
A. Drafters are Legal Professionals with Goals Other Than Juror Comprehension
First and foremost, the attorneys and judges who draft jury instructions
often have goals in drafting other than aiding jurors' comprehension
of the law. 8 While attorneys and judges recognize that the instructions
must communicate the law to the jury, their primary focus in drafting is to
provide correct and neutral statements of the law that will survive appellate
review. 9 They want the instructions to correctly reflect the law, thus they
often employ the language directly from statutes, which is written for legal
professionals and not lay citizens. 30 Drafters focus on the needs of other
legal professionals when creating jury instructions:
As the drafters work on the jury instructions, they have fellow judges and
lawyers in mind. The drafters struggle to create jury instructions that
accurately convey the law as it has been expressed in statutes or interpreted in
case law. They strive to use "neutral" language that does not favor plaintiffs or
defendants. They are concerned with the nuances of words and phrases and
whether an instruction they have written accurately tracks the requirements
of a statute or the elements of a judicial test. They are comfortable with the
legal language because they have been trained in it.... The drafters are
hard-pressed to put themselves in the position of those who hear these
words for the first time and who have not had the benefit of such training.3
As appellate court reviews of these instructions usually focus on whether
the instruction language is an accurate representation of the law,32 it is
26 Dumas, supra note 4, at 713.
27 Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 8I NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 449,458-75 (2OO6).
28 Id. at 458-63.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 459.
31 Id. at 460.
32 Id. at 461.
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understandable that the drafters take such care in crafting the language of
the instructions. Unfortunately, while the drafters write instructions with
the primary goal of passing appellate review and the secondary goal of juror
comprehension, no great strides towards reform can be made.33
B. Jury Instructions Serve Goals Other Than Communicating the
Law to the Jury
A second reason that jury instruction reform has been slow is that the
legalese and complex sentences of jury instructions serve purposes other
than communicating the law to the jury.-' Some legal scholars argue that
one of the purposes of the instructions is to "inspire respect for the judge,
the proceedings, and the power of the law."35 Even if the jurors do not
understand their instructions, the difficult and arcane language arguably
causes them to respect the judge's authority and appreciate the importance
of their role in the trial process.36 Other scholars and legal professionals
counter that lay jurors recognize the importance of their role and respect
the judge's authority with or without these instructions, because they are
not familiar with a courtroom and the trial proceedings. As a circuit judge
argued, "We have to reject any unspoken fear that using 'plain' or more
common language will somehow make us appear less knowledgeable, and/
or diminish the integrity of the proceedings. ' 37 Regardless of whether these
ulterior goals are being achieved to lay forth the authority of the court, jury
instructions continue to be drafted with these motives in mind.
C. Judicial Skepticism Regarding Jurors' Incomprehension
Jury instruction reform has also been slow because many judges are
skeptical that a comprehension problem exists at all. There is a general
presumption in the courts that jurors understand their instructions.38 The
U.S. Supreme Court has said that "[a] crucial assumption underlying [the]
system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge."3 9 This presumption is hard to overcome, particularly because of
judges' skepticism regarding the truth in empirical studies.
4
0
Many courts have been reluctant to recognize the findings of empirical
33 Id. at 460.
34 Id. at 464.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 465.
37 Scott Donaldson, Is It Time for the "Plain English" Jury Charge?, 66 ALA. LAw. 6o, 63
(2005).
38 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
39 Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (I979).
40 See Marder, supra note 27, at 490.
2009-zo010]
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studies, not only in regard to juror comprehension issues, but also in other
areas of the law. For example, many studies have tested the reliability of
eyewitness testimony.41 Yet, courts have consistently refused to instruct
juries on the potential for unreliable eyewitness testimony.4 Their refusal
stems from a general mistrust of empirical studies and a reluctance to deny
the general public's assumption that we can trust in the truth of what we
and others see.43
This same problem has occurred in regard to research suggesting that
jurors do not understand the law presented to them in their instructions. A
notable case in Illinois arose when James Free, a man convicted of murder
and sentenced to death, challenged his sentence on the grounds that the
jury did not understand the sentencing instructions."4 Free challenged the
Illinois death penalty scheme on multiple grounds, but three are relevant to
the current discussion. Free claimed that the statute and jury instructions
had a presumption in favor of the death penalty, that the instructions failed
to properly guide the jury, creating a risk that the death penalty would
be arbitrarily imposed, and that the sentencing scheme failed to set out a
specific standard of proof.
45
Free supported his contentions with the work of the noted jury
researcher, Hans Zeisel. Zeisel conducted a study with mock jurors and
individuals that were called for jury service in Cook County, Illinois, but
not selected. 6 He presented them with instructions based on the Illinois
pattern instructions for the death penalty, although not identical to those
used in Free's case.47 Zeisel's study found that the jurors did not understand
a number of the instructions, most notably the mitigating instruction.4 The
Illinois instructions included a number of examples of mitigating factors
that the jury should consider, though the list was not comprehensive.
Zeisel found that the jurors in his study believed the mitigating factors
they could consider in sentencing must be similar to the examples listed in
the instructions.49 On the recommendation from the magistrate concerning
this "overwhelming empirical evidence,"50 the district judge held that it
was reasonable that Free's jury did not comprehend the instructions, and
41 See, e.g., Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sc. Am., Dec. 1974, at 23.
42 Marder, supra note 27, at 468.
43 Id. at 468-69.
44 Free v. Peters, 12 F3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1993).
45 United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F Supp. 431,434 (N.D. III. 1991) (referring the
matter to a magistrate for evidentiary hearings).
46 Peters, 12 F3d at 705.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 United States ex rel Free v. Peters, 8o6 F. Supp. 705, 708 (N.D. Il1. 1992).
50 Id. at 726.
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he issued a writ of habeas corpus."'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Zeisel's
empirical research because it found flaws in the methodology of the study."
Although the court "acknowledge[d]-at least, implicitly-that empirical
evidence might be able to rebut the presumption that jurors understand
their instructions[,] ... it imposed almost impossibly high standards on such
proof." 3 The court required that Zeisel's study use revised instructions to
prove that the language of the given instructions was the problem, rather than
some other factor.- Furthermore, the court said that juror comprehension
is improved simply by being in the courtroom to see the evidence and hear
the arguments, rather than be presented with a written record as they were
in Zeisel's study 5 A problem arises, however, because evidence of actual
juror confusion in real cases is barred by the rule preventing jurors from
impeaching their verdict. As one appellate court has observed:
One enduring element of the jury system, no less vital today than two
centuries ago, is insulation from questions about how juries actually decide.
Jurors who volunteered that they did not understand their instructions would
not be permitted to address the court, and a defendant could not upset
a verdict against him even if all of the jurors signed affidavits describing
chaotic and uninformed deliberations.
5 6
The court of appeals in Free has set a nearly impossible barrier for
empirical studies to meet in order to overcome the presumption that jurors
understand jury instructions, at least in the Seventh Circuit. It seems that
the study must use actual jurors rather than mock jurors, but the testimony
of actual jurors regarding their confusion over the law in the instructions is
inadmissible to impeach their verdict.5 7
In dissent, Judge Cudahy criticized the majority for being too quick to
dismiss the findings of a respected researcher and the findings of both the
magistrate judge and district court. He accused the majority of "simply
ignor[ing] their conclusions as the product of slap-dash research and
scatter-brained analysis" rather than seriously considering the empirical
evidence.5 8
While the Seventh Circuit took a very harsh and critical view of
51 Id. at 732.
52 Id. at 706.
53 Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to LegalReform: ImprovingtheLanguage ofJury Instructions,
66 BROOK. L. REV. io8i, io91 (2oo0).
54 Free v. Peters, 12 F3d 700, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1993).
55 Id.
56 Gacy v. Welborn, 994 Fad 30 5 ,313 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
57 Tiersma, supra note 53, at io9z.
58 Peters, 1 2 E3d at 709 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
2009-2o1o]
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empirical studies regarding juror comprehension of instructions, some
courts have looked more favorably on such evidence. In Mitchell v.
Gonzales, the California Supreme Court assigned error in the state's pattern
jury instruction on proximate cause because it found that it could lead
to confusion for the jurors. 5 9 In making this finding, the court relied on
empirical studies conducted by Robert and Veda Charrow.6° Unfortunately,
instances of courts finding error in confusing jury instructions are the
"exceptions that prove the rule."'6'
Jury instruction reform is not only slowed by judges' skepticism
regarding juror incomprehension and their reluctance to acknowledge the
empirical evidence supporting it, but also because of the suspicion that
juries listen to the instructions at all. Some judges, particularly those that
are skeptical of the jury system in general, argue that jurors do not listen to
instructions and will not apply them to the facts no matter how easy they
are to understand. 61 Other judges think that jury instructions do not make
a great deal of difference and that the jury can reach the correct verdict,
even without instructions.63
D. Respect for Tradition
Lastly, jury instructions have been generally resistant to change because
of a respect for tradition. This emphasis on traditional jury instructions
stems from the idea of instructions as precedent:
The instructions have been passed down from judge to judge.... [T]reatise
writers collected judges' instructions so that they could be disseminated
beyond an individual judge's courtroom.... States have their own pattern
instructions and it is in the interest of state judges to follow the pattern
instructions, and thus, to minimize the chance of reversal on appeal based
on jury instructions. 64
Additionally, some studies suggest that judges and attorneys regard
instructions as sacred texts that are so familiar that they no longer think
about the meaning of the words, much less whether or not they are clear to
59 Mitchell v. Gonzalez, 819 P.2d. 872, 878-79 (Cal. 1991) (affirmed order by court of ap-
peals reversing trial judgment).
6o Id. at 877 (citing Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1353
('979)).
61 Michael J. Saks, Improving Communications in the Courtroom: Judicial Nulfication, 68
IND. L.J. 1281, 1288 0993).
62 Marder, supra note 27, at 472 (discussing the arguments of Judge Jerome Frank).
63 Id. at 473.
64 Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
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individuals without legal training.65
Because of these various long-held beliefs and assumptions, jury
instructions and general reform to the jury process have been resistant to
changes. Despite this reality, some states have embraced reform, most
notably in California and Arizona. 66 Still, there are some scholars who
recognize that jurors do not understand the law communicated in the
instructions or how to apply it to the facts of a case, yet argue that this level
of juror incomprehension is actually preferable to reform.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED FOR GREATER CLARITY
While many scholars and legal professionals have proposed reforms to the
language of jury instructions and the need for greater juror comprehension
since the 1970s, some individuals have argued that reforming instructions
to give greater clarity will "unwittingly damage important functions and
delicate balances, and make certain institutional goals more difficult to
achieve. ' 67 Yet, many states have successfully initiated reforms in the
language of jury instructions and the process of instructing the jury that
provide greater juror comprehension and thereby improve the fairness of
trials. 68
A. Reforming Jury Instructions Will Not Undermine
Other Institutional Functions
Historically, the idea of jury nullification was valued as a way to protect
citizens from unjust outcomes under the law. In colonial America, "jurors
had a duty to find a verdict according to their own conscience, though in
opposition to the direction of the court .... ,,69 When the law led to unjust
verdicts, jurors could simply nullify the law by refusing to follow it and
following their own conscience instead.
Since the Revolutionary War, the idea of jury nullification has become
less popular and is no longer viewed favorably. However, juries still have
the power to nullify the law if they so choose.70 Some scholars argue that,
although judges typically dislike jury nullification and support the jury
applying the correct law to the facts in reaching their decision, judges have
been the most resistant to making changes to ensure that juries properly
65 Id. at 474-75.
66 See infra Part III(B)(i)-(2).
67 Saks, supra note 61, at 1295.
68 Marder, supra note 27, at 475-8i.
69 United States v. Dougherty, 473 Fad 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70 Saks, supra note 6 1, at 1285.
zoo9 -2o0o]
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apply the law.71 Professor Michael Saks of the University of Iowa suggests
that:
Courts have not only ignored the new data but actually have moved the
law in the direction opposite to the suggestions of the social scientists.
Legislatures generally have done nothing or moved only slightly toward the
suggested reforms. Commissions have made the most substantial changes,
engaging in extensive reform of jury instruction procedures along the lines
suggested by the research.
72
Saks explains this trend in terms of "judicial nullification," arguing that there
exist institutional functions that are managed through jury instructions. 3
1. Judicial Nullification Provides Increased Judicial Control.- First, Saks
suggests that judicial nullification provides judges increased control over
case outcomes. "Where the judge believes that the desired outcome of
the case would be impeded by the law, the judge can nullify the law and
allow the jury to use its equities to reach the result the judge desires."' 4
Moreover, if the instructions are incomprehensible to the jury, the judge is
better able to communicate his or her own views of the case through his or
her non-verbal behavior.
7
Many scholars support this behavior, arguing that judges will know when
following the "letter of the law would lead to results contrary to the law's
true intent."'76 Nevertheless, allowing judges to nullify the law when they
see fit could have negative consequences. Following the law ensures that
everyone is treated even-handedly, whereas judicial nullification allows a
judge to treat individuals differently depending on the judge's adjudication
of the case. Furthermore, the law provides needed guidelines for people's
behavior. If the application of the law is too unpredictable, individuals will
not know what is expected of them.
2. Judicial Nullification Reinforces the Adversarial System.- Saks also
argues that judicial nullification reinforces the adversarial system. He
hypothesizes that while judges may give ineffective instructions, attorneys
are actually instructing jurors on the law through their arguments and their
closing statements." Saks believes this is a better system, because it would
71 Id. at 1289.
72 Id. (quoting J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions
Following Empirical Research on Jury Instrucions, 25 LAw & Soc'y REV. 155, 157 (199 )).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1290.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1291-92.
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allow parties more control over the trial's presentation78 and would provide
instructions with greater clarity and adversarial purpose.7 9
He also thinks it will increase efficiency by dividing the duties of
instructing the jury.80 Yet, Saks again ignores the importance of having
clearly defined and predictable laws. Attorneys would no doubt be able
to stretch and skew the law to best fit their needs, maybe to the point of
making it unrecognizable from its original form. Furthermore, dealing with
the number of objections that would undoubtedly arise from the opposing
party's instructions on the law would be time consuming and influence how
juries perceive the law and the legal process.
3. Wariness of Reforming Traditional Models.- Lastly, Saks argues that
"historical inertia" is a reason for difficult and often incomprehensible
jury instructions.8' He argues that instructions full of legalese and difficult
language were developed in English law as a method to temper unduly
harsh or unfair outcomes that would result from juries following the letter
of the law.82 He suggests avoiding unjust laws or the unjust application
of laws by allowing the jury to follow its own intuitions and conscience.
83
Again, this suggestion ignores the need for clearly defined laws as guidance.
It also disregards the regrettable truth that the judgments of the majority
may not always be correct, and thus, nullification would allow the majority
to oppress the minority.
Although it is true that the process of instructing the jury and the
instructions themselves serve other functions in the trial process than
merely conveying the law to jurors, the need to preserve these functions is
an insufficient reason to avoid jury instruction reforms. Courts and lawyers
have generally been resistant to reforms regarding instructions out of fear
that those reforms will upset well-established practices and balances of
power within the courtroom.' Yet, there is no proof that reforms will upset
these other functions or that other procedures in the trial cannot serve the
same purposes. Furthermore, these concerns fail to take into account the
great benefit of instructing a jury so that they can understand and properly
apply the law. In fact, many states have begun to reform their instructional
process with great success.
78 Id. at 1292.
79 Id. at 1291.
8o Idat 1292.
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Janessa E. Shtabsky, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standardfor Reform with Its
New Jury Rules?, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1oo9, I o i i (1996).
2009"-20101
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B. Successful State Reforms
While changes to the jury process and jury instructions have been
generally slow, a few states have made much-needed and drastic changes.
1. California's Blue Ribbon Commission.- California undertook one of the
most extensive efforts at rewriting its pattern jury instructions to eliminate
legalese and incorporate "language that [would] be understandable to
jurors. ' 85 After O.J. Simpson was acquitted of murder in his criminal trial,
"the Judicial Council of California established a Blue Ribbon Commission
on Jury System Improvement to review its [current] system" and suggest
improvements. The Commission recommended the implementation
of a task force to redraft pattern jury instructions to promote juror
comprehension. 87 Although the ultimate task force consisted mainly of
judges and attorneys, two lay members also assisted in the drafting of new
civil and criminal jury instructions.88
Rewriting was extensive and made use of plain language principles.
89
Typical problems that arise in jury instructions include legal vocabulary,
nominalizations, 9 use of negatives, 9' complex sentences, 9 "use ofthe passive
voice," 93 compound sentences,' and use of "unique determiners... like
'such' and 'said' [when] 'the' or 'this' would suffice." 95 The reforms greatly
simplified the language of the instructions and incorporated references
to everyday life to better communicate with the jurors. For example, an
original instruction stated that "[flailure of recollection is common [and]
[i]nnocent misrecollection is not uncommon." 6 The revised instruction
provides that "[pleople often forget things or make mistakes in what they
remember."97  California's original instruction regarding circumstantial
evidence read as follows: "Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if
85 J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1444 (1996).
86 Marder, supra note 27, at 475-76.
87 See id. at 476.
88 Id.
89 See id. at 477.
90 Dylan Lager Murray, Plain English or Plain Confusing?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 345, 355
(1997).
91 Id. at 356.
92 Id. at 358.
93 Id. at 361.
94 Id. at 362.
95 Id. at 357-58.
96 JOHN M. DINSE ET AL., CALIFORNIAJURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2:21 (9th ed. 2003).
97 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 107 (2003).
[Vol. 98
JURY INSTRUCTION REFORM
found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence
of another fact may be drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that may
logically and reasonably be drawn from one or more facts established by
the evidence."98 By using examples from jurors' every day experiences,
the revised instruction better illustrates the meaning of circumstantial
evidence. The new instruction states:
Some evidence proves a fact directly, such as testimony of a witness who saw
a jet plane flying across the sky. Some evidence proves a fact indirectly, such
as testimony of a witness who saw only the white trail that jet planes often
leave. This indirect evidence is sometimes referred to as "circumstantial
evidence." In either instance, the witness's testimony is evidence that a jet
plane flew across the sky."
These new instructions are much simpler and will no doubt be easier for
jurors to understand. Some critics have argued that the new instructions
are "dumbed-down,"'" but the reforms have generally been met with
support and enthusiasm.
2. Arizona Reforms.- Arizona also undertook major changes to its entire
jury system in the early 1990s.11' Not only did Arizona draft new pattern
jury instructions, taking into account the principles of plain language, but it
also made changes to the timing and delivery of instructions to the jury.102
These changes put Arizona in the "vanguard of jury reform," even a decade
later.103 Some of the Arizona reforms include:
[A]illowing jurors to submit written questions for witnesses during the
trial, allowing jurors to engage in preverdict deliberations in civil trials,
and allowing researchers to film some of the actual jury deliberations to
study how the new reforms were working .... There were changes to the
timing and presentation of [jury] instructions ... as well as a commitment to
plain language instructions and to gearing the instructions to a sixth-grade
reading level.... [Flor a jury that had reached an impasse, the judge was to
eschew the traditional Allen charge, and instead, to instruct the jury that the
judge was available to engage in dialogue with the jury if the jury thought
that it would help to resolve the impasse."' 10
98 DINSE ET AL., supra note 96, at § 2:00.
99 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 97, at § 202.
Io Marder, supra note 27, at 477.
ioi Id.at478.
102 Armour, supra note 8, at 657.
103 Marder, supra note 27, at 478.
1o4 Id. at 478-79.
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These reforms are far-reaching, encompassing not only changes to the
language of the instructions, but also transforming the entire process of
instructing and engaging the jury so as to optimize juror comprehension.' 5
One of the most important of the Arizona reforms is the move away
from the traditional Allen charge to creating a "dialogue" between the
judge and jury. 6 Traditionally, when jurors reached an impasse the judge
would give them an Allen charge by "reminding [the jurors] of the nature
of their duty and the time and expense of a trial, and urging them to try
again to reach a verdict."107 Under the new Arizona reforms, the judge and
jury work together to decide if "there is additional information that either
the judge or counsel are permitted to provide that would assist the jury in
its decisionmaking." 108 This approach allows for a more active role on the
part of jurors and allows judges to provide the information and direction
needed for jurors to fulfill their duties.
3. Other States' Reforms.- Many states have undertaken various reforms
of their jury systems, though most are not as extensive as those made in
California and Arizona. According to the National Center for State Courts
and the American Judicature Society, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, and North
Dakota have sought to simplify their jury instructions, at least to some
extent, by employing plain language principles. 109
For example, Delaware sends drafts of instructions to an expert who
then edits them to comply with plain language."f0 The Seventh Circuit,
while being careful not to allow its reformed instructions to go so far in the
pursuit of simplicity as California, has attempted to redraft its instructions
to be "shorter, more direct and to the point.""' The District of Columbia
did a year-long study assessing the federal and state jury systems, and while
the project did not make recommendations on redrafting of instructions, it
did recommend giving jurors written copies of the instructions, using case-
specific and interim instructions, and providing the substantive instructions
before closing arguments rather than after the arguments."'
These state reforms also have led to changes in areas other than jury
instructions, including allowing jurors to take notes, submit questions to
105 Id. at 478.
io6 See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79
JUDICATURE 280, 283 (1996).
107 United States v. Anderton, 679 End 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
io8 Marder, supra note 27, at 480.
In9 Id. at 481.
iio Id.
iII Id.
112 Armour, supra note 8, at 658.
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witnesses, and participate in pre-deliberation discussions. 13 The most
common instruction-related reforms include "(1) providing a written copy
of instructions for jurors, (2) issuing substantive instructions before opening
statements, (3) issuing substantive instructions before the onset of closing
arguments, and (4) crafting instructions with simpler language.""' 4 All the
various reforms across the nation show "common sense assessments of how
human beings assimilate and analyze information.""'s
IV. A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO JURY REFORMS is NEEDED
While the need to eradicate legalese and employ plain language in
jury instructions receives the most attention from scholars and legal
professionals, this technique must be coupled with other changes in the
entire jury process to ensure juror comprehension. Reforms must focus
not only on redrafting the language, but also on changing the processes by
which the jury receives its instructions and participates in the proceedings.
The successes of this more drastic approach in California and Arizona show
the importance of recognizing that jurors do not comprehend the law used
in jury instructions.
There are many factors that intersect in jurors' decision-making
processes. First, there is the language and terms used in the instructions
and how well lay jurors are able to understand and articulate their meaning
in deliberations. This can be further complicated by the "prevalence of
certain [legal] terms in popular culture," where jurors may be exposed to
definitions of certain terms or phrases in a manner that does not comport
with the actual legal meaning.1 16 Second, there is the trial structure itself,117
which involves the timing of the instructions related to the arguments and
the offering of evidence. Third, there is the manner in which the instructions
are given. Generally, the instructions are read in one long lecture by the
judge with no opportunity for the jury to ask for clarification, take notes, or
follow along with their own copy of the instructions. 118 Finally, there are also
many problems that arise from the "dynamics of group decision-making"
that are exacerbated by the lack of guidance provided by the judge."9
All of these various factors come together and influence the jury's
decision-making process. Thus, no reform of the jury instructions can
113 Id. at 658-59.
114 Id.
i15 Neil P. Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM. L. RE. , 35
(2003).
116 Armour, supra note 8, at 656.
117 Id.
i18 See Marder, supra note 27, at 491.
1i9 Id. at 656; see also Roger M. Young, Using Social Science to Assess the NeedforJury Reform
in South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 135, 150 (2000).
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completely address the issue of juror incomprehension without accounting
for all these factors. This holistic approach to jury reform will maximize the
ability of jurors to understand the law presented them and apply it to the
facts of the case, thus ensuring that every defendant's constitutional right
to a trial by jury is fulfilled.
A. Redrafting Jury Instructions in Plain Language
The first reform that any jurisdiction must undertake is the redrafting
of pattern jury instructions. As discussed, it is unlikely that these changes
will come from the judiciary for various reasons, including fear of reversal
on appeal, skepticism regarding the problem and the potential to fix it, and
concern that jury instructions serve purposes other than communicating
the law to the jury.' Consequently, committees are best suited to draft
new plain language instructions.
First and foremost, the drafters must recognize that the instructions
should be "jury-centric."' 2' The primary goal of the instructions should
be to properly instruct the jury on the law and how it is to be applied in
a manner that is correct, concise, and readily understandable to the lay
person. Although avoiding reversal on appeal will always be a concern,
courts should primarily focus their efforts on providing a fair trial to the
parties. To this end, committees should not only include judges and
attorneys, but also a number of non-legal members who can offer insights
into the instructions that legal professionals miss given their training. 22
Committees should also strive to have the input of lay persons through
empirical testing, incorporating the work of social scientists over the past
thirty years. This will provide another avenue to receive lay persons' input
and help the committees to further understand how jurors comprehend
instructions and apply them to the facts.
Specific changes can simplify the language of jury instructions and
improve juror comprehension. The principles of plain language, for
example, suggest avoiding negatives, third-person voice, and passive voice,
and suggest incorporating contractions and "examples to illustrate how
the law applies."'2 President Clinton mandated that these principles be
incorporated into government writing in an effort to make the government
"more responsive, accessible, and understandable in its communications
with the public."'21 4 These same principles can and should be incorporated
120 Marder, supra note 27, at 458-75.
121 Id. at 482.
122 Tiersma, supra note 53, at I too (discussing the composition of the Judicial Council of
California's Task Force on Jury Instructions).
123 Joseph Kimble, How to Mangle Court Rules and Jury Instructions, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 39, 53-54 (2001I-2OO2).
124 Memorandum on Plain Language in Governmental Writing, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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into jury instructions to facilitate jurors' understanding of the law and aid
them in providing a fair application of the law to the facts.
B. Timing of Jury Instructions
Following many of the reforms already instituted in various
jurisdictions, changes also must to be made to the manner in which the
jurors receive instructions. Typically, jurors do not receive an instruction on
the law to be applied until after the closing arguments.' The instructions
provide a context with which to view the evidence. The problem
with this method is that the jury has already heard all the evidence
and likely begun forming conclusions before knowing the applicable
law.l1 6 Thus, by providing the substantive instructions at the beginning
of the trial, the court can improve juror comprehension and establish a
context for jurors to understand the evidence presented during trial. Rather
than reiterate the instructions after the closings, judges should refresh
the jurors' memories by providing instructions before the closings, again
reminding the jurors of the context with which to judge the evidence.
In addition to providing substantive instructions at the beginning of
the trial and before closings, judges should instruct the jury as needed
throughout the trial. This may include instructions regarding particular
evidence matters that arise, admonitions, or limiting instructions. 7 While
repeatedly stopping the trial to instruct or explain issues to the jury will
lengthen the trial, the benefits of jurors' comprehension of the trial process,
the evidence, and the law far outweighs this concern.
C. Other Reforms
In addition to reforming the language and timing of instructions, other
changes can easily be made to engage jurors in the trial process and increase
their comprehension.
Providing jurors with a written copy of the instructions, both while the
instructions are being read by the judge and in the deliberation room, can
aid their understanding by allowing them to actively follow along rather
than passively listen to dense, unfamiliar material. The judge's reading of
the instructions has been compared to a professor giving a lecture., 8 In
order to maintain the jury's attention to the material, courts should provide
written copies so that the jurors can follow along. Allowing jurors to take
notes on the instructions will also keep their attention and help them note
Doc. iojo (June 1, 1998).
125 Marder, supra note 27, at 491.
126 See id.
127 Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REv. 681, 692-93 (2000).
128 Marder, supra note 27, at 452.
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questions they have or instructions they find particularly important. It will
further assist jurors to have copies of the instructions in their deliberations
so they can be reminded of the language and any terms that they do not
fully comprehend.
Following Arizona's lead in eliminating the Allen charge is another
important step in engaging the jury and assisting it in reaching a decision.
Permitting judges to dialogue with jurors and provide additional information
necessary for jurors to reach a decision, courts will not only improve jurors'
comprehension and decision making process but will also prevent hung
juries. Additionally, judges must be able to respond to jurors' questions by
doing more than rereading the pertinent part of the instructions. Judges
must be allowed to respond to jurors' questions in a meaningful way that
will clarify the instruction so the law can be administered properly.
Juror engagement can also be furthered by allowing them to
anonymously submit their questions to witnesses. Not only will this
increase juror comprehension by encouraging them to pay attention and
participate in the proceedings, but it also will benefit attorneys to know the
issues on which the jury is focusing. Jurors should also be encouraged to
take notes throughout the trial as a way to stay engaged and ensure they
will remember important points. Some courts also have jurors participate
in pre-verdict deliberations. All of these reforms, when made together,
address the various factors that contribute to juror incomprehension and
aid in the decision-making process to ensure that defendants receive their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to a jury trial.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution guarantees the right of a trial by jury,19 but the crisis of
jurors' incomprehension of the law threatens this guarantee, because jurors
consistently fail to apply the law correctly, which thereby leads to unfair
trials. Though research conducted over the past thirty years documents
jurors' difficulty in understanding jury instructions and suggests possible
solutions, courts have been reluctant to introduce reforms. There are four
primary reasons for this reluctance: the drafters of jury instructions are
legal professionals, there are often goals other than juror comprehension,
judicial skepticism of the reliability of empirical data, and a hesitance
to break with tradition. Some scholars have argued that reforming jury
instructions will undermine other functions that the instructions serve in
addition to conveying the law to the jury. These concerns are unpersuasive,
however, because they fail to fully account for the benefits of the proposed
reforms and the ability of other aspects of the trial process to fulfill these
functions.
129 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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In order to ensure that jurors comprehend the law and properly apply
it, reforms must be holistic, focusing on both the language and process
of the instructions. First and foremost, instructions must be rewritten in
plain language that is easy for jurors to understand. Also, giving substantive
instructions at the beginning of the trial and before closings will give the
jurors a context with which to view the evidence. Other reforms, such as
giving each juror a copy of the instructions, allowing judges to respond
to juror questions, and allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses will
further help juror comprehension and engage jurors in the trial. A holistic
reform encompassing these various reforms is the best way to ensure that
jurors comprehend the law and defendants truly receive a fair trial.

